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2Background
• US Navy weapon and combat system 
acquisition programs are evolving
– Drive to implement Open Architecture (OA)
– Increasing levels of software complexity
• Acquisition and demonstration of safe 
software becomes a more challenging task 
– Increased safety risk, cost & schedule overruns
– Difficulty proving system safety to independent 
review boards
Problem
• There is no standard methodology in place 
for program managers to follow regarding 
software safety
– Current management practice varies from 
program to program
– Reactive vs. proactive evaluation approach
– Focus of this research: gun systems software 
safety
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Software Safety Program Management 
Strategy Needed
• Methodical and effective approach
• Strategy goals
– Reduce average number of safety issues
– Improve process for handling issues 
encountered
– Reduce surprises encountered during 
SSSTRP and WSESRB
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Developing the Risk Management 
Strategy
• Identify common risks…
– Among current gun system acquisition programs
– For future OA software-based gun systems
• Develop mitigation strategies to address each 
common risk
• Combine into a program management level 
software safety risk management strategy
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Identifying Common Safety Risks for 
Today’s Gun Systems
• Conduct survey, discuss experiences & 
lessons learned
– Program Managers & Safety Community Members
• Analyze SSSTRP process:
– Panel members
– Characteristics of systems being reviewed
• Research OA / COTS Specific Risks
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Identifying Common Safety Risks for 
Today’s Gun Systems (cont)
• Obtain SSSTRP reports on recent gun 
system acquisition programs
• Extract & catalog findings from each report
– Categorize findings into project management and 
safety management areas
• Analyze data, identifying common risks & 
trends
– Identify OA-related issues
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– Integration & Testing
– Configuration 
Management
– Validation & Verification
– Risk Management
– Deployment & 
Maintenance
• Safety Management
– System Safety Program
– Software Safety Program
– Safety Risk Management
– Safety Verification / 
Audits
– Hazard Tracking
– COTS, GOTS, NDI
– Sim, Stim, Emulation
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Category definitions are evolving via 
collaboration with various members of the 
DoD systems safety community
Developing Risk Mitigation Strategies
• Identify successful actions used to resolve 
historical issues
• Apply existing/proven risk mitigation 
methodologies from OA and PM domains 
• Develop custom techniques if needed
• Continue a centralized SSSTRP findings 
database to track future opportunities
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Developing Risk Mitigation Strategies 
(cont)
• Combine risk mitigation methodologies and 
techniques into a program management methodology
• Provide methodology and assessments of the 
content to program managers for review and use
• Acquire feedback if possible to improve methodology
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Lessons Learned



































Data Collection in Progress
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Filename N3C5-G-10-146-1912.PDF
MK 34 MOD 4 - USS Bunker Hill (CG-52)
Purpose:
Concurrance to conduct structural test firings.
Finding Summary:
● Incorporate accurate data into software test build. (Insufficient Testing)
● Perform safety assessment after the modifications have been made.
● Verify and Validate software before structural testing
● Incorporate safety schedule into program schedule
● Perform interface safety assessment between training system and weapon.
● Show that all safety risks have been accepted in accordance to DoDI 500.2
● Establish a Hazard Tracking Database
● Provide status of prior SSSTRP Findings.
Comments:
The SSSTRP took exception to the fact that this program decided to seek concurrance to conduct structural 
test firings with software that was still under development.  I suspect that the previous version of this 
software had been accepted by the SSSTRP but safety assessments need to be performed and presented 
to the SSSTRP.  Also, the risks associated with the changes needs to be determined.
Example of data extracted from 
an SSSTRP report for current 
gun programs
Several years of historical SSSTRP data under 
analysis so far
Questions?
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